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The Origins of Governments: 
From Anarchy to Hierarchy 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A nice political economy literature has evolved that deals with the size distribution of nations, 
focusing on the gains and losses of breaking up or integrating regions (e.g. Bolton et al. 1996, 
Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Spolaore 1997).  Among the key issues that play a role are 
potential efficiency gains in terms of public good provision from creating larger units, versus 
associated heterogeneity costs (in terms of policy preferences) and distributional issues.  One 
relevant application concerns scale economies in the production of military might, so it is not 
surprising that the impact of international conflict on endogenous border formation has been 
studied in some detail (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore 2005, 2006).  One interpretation of this political 
economy literature is that it addresses the question why the whole world is not integrated in a 
single nation (Bolton et al. 1996).  In this paper we consider the polar opposite question –– why do 
we find clustering of a set of homogenous individuals with similar abilities and preferences into 
“hierarchical groups” (or nations) in the first place?  This amounts to an enquiry into the origins 
and evolution of hierarchic structure in societies.  Following Alesina and Spolaore we focus on 
conflict as a guiding theme. 
According to the definitions of Hirshleifer (1995), the world was characterized by phases 
of ‘amorphy’ and ‘anarchy’ prior to the emergence of nation states (‘hierarchy’).  Amorphy refers 
to societies without storage, where resources are consumed on the move.  This is clearly the 
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relevant state of affairs for most of mankind’s history – we have been mobile hunter-gatherers 
living from hand to mouth for millennia, and some societies still are.  Such societies did not need 
(organized) defense to prevent others from stealing belongings.  Other than the territory occupied 
for foraging, there was simply not much to steal.  This situation changed after the agricultural 
transition, some 10,000 years ago for early farming societies (see Weisdorf 2005).  Along with 
several other major changes to the human lifestyle, this involved production of surpluses and 
storage of commodities in a systematic way (e.g., Fernandez-Armesto 2001).  Growing crops is a 
seasonal activity, so that reliance on storage is necessary to survive from one harvest to another.  
Indeed, crops maturing in the field are also, to some degree, stored assets.  While possibly efficient 
in terms of aggregate production, storage also opens the door to theft – enabling a new economic 
sector (one of thieves and raiders) to emerge.  Anarchy, then, refers to a system of spontaneous 
order in which agents can seize and defend resources without regulation from above.  From a 
situation of anarchy societies may evolve towards hierarchy, where defense decisions are made by 
a central authority to incorporate the positive external effects of defense.  This likely happens 
when the gains from such a transition for the people exceed the costs. 
How important is the presence of storage in provoking a transition to hierarchy and greater 
social organization for the purposes of defense? Anthropologists have long recognized that 
capacity for production and storing resources has a profound impact on the social structure of 
society, a transformation that is evident even when comparing hunter-gatherers. Woodburn (1982), 
for example, draws a distinction between simple and complex hunter-gatherers. Complex hunter-
gatherers featured some degree of hierarchy, admitted a degree of inequality among citizens and 
chiefs, and possessed economies that relied heavily on stored resources. They were also more 
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likely to engage in organized warfare, own specific tracts of land, and practice slavery.1 Kelly 
(1995, p. 311), in his synopsis of the differences between simple and complex hunter-gatherers 
puts it succinctly: “… storage carries with it the seeds of conflict.”  Anthropologists have also 
invoked the link between storage and hierarchy at higher levels. In his classic text, Harris (1997, p. 
295) points out that taxation is only possible if there is some degree of storage capacity present in 
the society, and also argues that there are greater possibilities for the development and 
maintenance of hierarchy in the presence of resources that are storable.2 
The transition from amorphy to anarchy and on to hierarchy, triggered by the accumulation 
of wealth (‘lootable assets’), implies an evolutionary trajectory characterized by (i) the absence of 
thieving and raiding, followed by (ii) the rise of thieving and raiding and decentralized defense 
levels, which in turns might give way to (iii) the emergence of hierarchic structure to provide 
efficient levels of law and order.  The corollary is that in times of economic downturns and loss of 
assets, hierarchic societies may regress to anarchy.  Indeed, there is evidence of this, too.  For 
example, Bell (1971) links the rise and fall of Egyptian kingdoms to variations in affluence.  
During years of prosperity, Egyptians were represented by a strong and wealthy kingship that 
upheld a stable society.  But periods of economic misery (e.g. prolonged periods of drought) would 
cause kingships to break down.3  Similar evidence exists for the fall of the Maya civilization and 
Roman Empire, and the plight of the society on Easter Island (see Diamond 2005).  Indeed, even 
up to the time of the Industrial Revolution, shifts between economic prosperity/misery and 
hierarchy/anarchy existed. Between 1560 and 1770, for example, England experienced “numerous 
                                                 
1 The classic example are the hunter-gatherer peoples of the Pacific Northwest of North America. Kelly (1995, p. 302) 
lists a few other societies that fit this mold, including some peoples of California, the Ainu in Japan, and the Calusa of 
Florida.  
2 As an example, Harris (1997, p. 296) describes work in Earle (1989), Hommon (1986) and Kirch (1984) on the 
origins and development of Hawaiian society, arguing that the lack of capacity to produce a storable grain inhibited the 
development of a larger, centralized state on the island chain.  
3 For example, around 2180 BCE the Egyptian Kingdom, known as Dynasty VI, collapsed. During the following so-
called Egyptian Dark Age, which lasted 20-25 years, “hardly any form of civil disorder was absent, ranging from strife 
between districts, to looting and killing … to individual crime run riot, to revolution and social anarchy” (ibid. p. 7). 
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periods of political turmoil, internal warfare, and important changes in political regimes” (Clark 
1996, p. 568). 
This study provides a model that links technological progress to the existence of hierarchic 
structures upholding the rule of law.  Kings or ruling elites (in what follows we use these terms 
interchangeably) can provide such a service and arguably represent the predecessor of nation 
states.  Kings taxed their farmers to finance the provision of law and order, as well as their own 
consumption.  While the political economy literature on the size distribution of nations mentioned 
above typically assumes a government maximizing the benefits of the median voter, we introduce 
a selfish ruler maximizing its own surplus.  The tradeoff for the people, therefore, is not to balance 
efficiency gains (public goods) versus heterogeneity costs, as in most of the existing literature on 
jurisdictional size.  Instead, they choose between being raided by thieves versus being taxed by a 
king.  We analyze the economic incentives for the transition from anarchy to hierarchy against the 
backdrop of population growth and endogenous technical change in production.   
There are two important prior contributions related to our work.4  First, Usher (1989) 
provides a model of so-called dynastic cycles – alternating periods of peace and prosperity on the 
one hand, and chaos and decline on the other.  A ruling elite provides socially optimal levels of 
defense, taking the public good nature of deterrence effort into account, bringing stability and 
setting the stage for populations to grow.  However, diminishing returns to labor will eventually 
lower incomes (and taxable surplus), eventually undermining the incentive for a ruler to provide 
public goods.  The result is a fall back into chaos and a decline in human population density, which 
in turn raises incomes.  Eventually, sufficient taxable surplus warrants the re-entry of a new king.  
An important difference between Usher (1989) and our work is that the transition from hierarchy 
                                                 
4 In addition to these two contributions, our paper is also somewhat related to earlier work on the origins of firms.  For 
example, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that putting in place a ”central common party to a set of bilateral 
contracts” facilitates efficient organization of the joint inputs, which is remeniscent of our story.  
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to anarchy is the result of a choice by the ruler in Usher, whereas we assume the people make such 
choices.   
Second, and closest to our work, Grossman (2002) considers the question whether 
producers are better off with centralized defenses organized by a ruler or with decentralized 
defense in a situation of anarchy.  We extend Grossman’s approach along three dimensions.  First, 
we employ a conventional conflict, or contest, function to describe the interaction between 
producers and raiders, and hence the benefits from a switching towards hierarchy.  Second, we 
develop a dynamic model where population size and the level of technology evolve endogenously 
so that we can analyze the evolution of anarchy to hierarchy.   Unlike Grossman, our model 
suggests the existence of multiple stable equilibria, underdevelopment traps in anarchy, and so on.  
Third, we explore some of the model’s implications using an existing dataset on lifestyle and 
material culture of indigenous peoples at various stages of development (the Standard Cross-
Cultural Sample, or SCCS dataset). Among other things, this data includes information on the 
technological sophistication and governance structure of a varied group of peoples, both past and 
present.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, as a motivating exercise, we demonstrate 
several empirical relationships between population density, the state of technology, and the state of 
hierarchy.  In Section 3 we present the static model. We start off by introducing the anarchic case 
of a society without a ruler, and then analyze the consequences of introducing a selfish king.  We 
compare payoffs for producers, and determine the conditions under which a king would be voted 
into office.  In Section 4 we introduce population growth and technological change and consider 
the dynamics of institutional development in more detail.  We interpret our specification of 
technical change as the gradual transition from foraging to early agriculture, and the accompanying 
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emergence of stored (and hence ‘lootable’) commodities.  In section 5 we present and discuss the 
main results.  Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  A Cross-Cultural Portrait of the Evolution of Hierarchy 
In this section, we describe how the emergence of hierarchy relates to some of the most basic 
characteristics of the economy. The evidence we present is intended to motivate our theoretical 
presentation and provide the reader some insights into how hierarchy apparently emerges from 
anarchy.  Since we seek to discuss the evolution of hierarchy from a state in which there is no 
higher authority or government, it is useful to employ data that allows comparison of societies in 
which there is no form of higher government with societies in which some hierarchy exists. Our 
approach is to study the incidence of hierarchy in a cross-section of different cultures.  
We employ the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (henceforth SCCS), an extensive and well-
documented cross-cultural data set originally developed in the work of Murdock and White 
(1969).5 The SCCS contains information on the technology, environment, and culture of 186 
different cultures, drawn from ethnographic reports assembled at different places and times from a 
spectrum of indigenous cultures. As separate data points, it includes sub-Saharan African hunter 
gatherers, Native American hunter-gatherers, European peoples, large-scale agricultural nation-
state cultures of Meso-America (such as the Aztecs), and historical nation-state peoples (such as 
the ancient Hebrews and Egyptians), among others. The geographical distribution of the societies 
in the SCCS is displayed on Map 1, which we shall discuss in more detail momentarily. The 
majority of the cultures in the SCCS were sampled at a time coinciding with or just after contact 
with western cultures (the mean date of contact among the cultures is 1850, but some observations 
                                                 
5 For more detailed descriptions of the data and its use in economics, see Baker (2005), Baker and Miceli (2004), and 
Pryor (1985). The dataset has expanded to include approximately 2000 variables, and is currently maintained by 
William Divale, who distributes updated versions of the SCCS in the journal World Cultures. We have also indicated 
the original source of the data where possible.    
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– for example, the ancient Egyptians – date from considerably earlier). These cultures can be taken 
as a reasonably representative of the cultural and technological diversity of human history.6  
< Map 1 about here >   
The SCCS contains some information that broadly captures the notion of hierarchy that we 
shall develop in our theory. While there are several candidate variables in the SCCS that might be 
used to measure the degree of hierarchy, available variables vary greatly in their quality and 
completeness. We settle on a variable referred to as “Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond the Local 
Community,” which we henceforth refer to as the degree of hierarchy.7  This variable runs on a 
scale from 1 to 5. A society earns a score of 1 if higher political authority is absent, a score of 2 if 
petty chiefs are present, and a 3 on the scale if it is a larger chiefdom. The scores 4 and 5 on the 
scale are reserved for state forms of government, where a society earns a 5 if the governance 
structure is that of a state with multiple jurisdictions.8  Since our theoretical below model is 
basically a dichotomous model of the emergence of hierarchy, we also present some evidence 
using a dichotomous hierarchy variable. This hierarchy dummy variable is constructed by 
awarding a society a score of 0 if there is no higher political authority (i.e., a score of 1 on the 
degree of hierarchy scale), and a 1 for all other values.   
We seek to offer evidence in support of the position that technological sophistication and, 
in particular, the presence of storage, are important determinants of hierarchy, and also that an 
important function of a hierarchy is policing. Thus, we employ a set of variables in the SCCS to 
measure technological sophistication, including the degree to which writing and record-keeping 
                                                 
6 The mean contact year for societies in the SCCS is 1853. However, it must be said that there is great variance in the 
amount of contact the societies in the SCCS have had with the modern western world, and further that the SCCS does 
not include any information about the degree to which societies have had contact with other centers of development, 
such as the Far East.  
7 This variable was originally coded by George Murdock (1967) in the Ethnographic Atlas, which is a larger but less 
complete cross cultural data set. 
8 There are other variables that might proxy for the degree of hierarchy in the SCCS, but choices among these 
variables do not make a big difference in the analysis. For example, Tuden and Marshall’s (1972) four-point scale 
 9
are present in a society, a measure of task specialization, a measure of whether or not storage and 
retention of surplus output is present in a particular society, and the contribution of agriculture to 
the food supply.9 These variables, along with some other variables (which serve as instruments in 
some of our regressions), are described in Table 1. The SCCS also contains some limited 
information on the function of the state, and we include some information on whether or not police 
are present or absent.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics, sorted by the presence or absence of hierarchy. A first 
point of interest is that the presence of hierarchy correlates strongly with the presence of police in 
any given society. This suggests that one of the most important functions of a hierarchy is 
enforcement of law and maintenance of property rights. The correlation coefficient between the 
police presence dummy and the presence of hierarchy is 0.68 (significant at 1%).  
< Tables 1 and 2 about here >    
To get a better feel for the relationship between hierarchy and technology, and in light of 
the fact that the technological variables plainly increase together, we have also constructed a 
univariate index of technology using principal components. The index is assembled from the first 
principal component of the three variables measuring technological specialization, agricultural 
importance and sophistication, and the presence of writing and record keeping. The first principal 
component captures a strongly positive association between the three variables and explains about 
64 percent of the joint variation in the three variables.10 We take this to mean that in one common 
dimension the overall level of technology in the society is increasing. We refer to the index so 
                                                                                                                                                                
rating the levels of sovereignty present in each society is also included in the SCCS. Our measure is heavily correlated 
with this variable (correlation coefficient of .77, significant at 1% level).  
9 The specialization scale variable, the reliance on agriculture scale variable, and the writing and record keeping 
variable were all coded originally by Murdock and White (1969). 
10 To be specific, the technology index is computed using the first principal component as follows: technology=.6217 
specialization + .5678 agriculture + .5396 writing. This component explains 64% of the joint variation in these 
variables. As one would expect, all the coefficients are positive, meaning that the four indices all vary strongly in one 
direction. Somewhat surprisingly, the three scale variables enter into the first principal component with very similar 
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constructed from this first principal component as “the level of technology,” or more succinctly, 
“technology.”  The resulting technology index has a mean of zero (by design), a minimum value of 
-2.34, and a maximum value of 2.40. A society for which the technology value is close to the 
lower limit can be thought of as one with a low reliance on agriculture, little or no record keeping 
and writing, and little task specialization. We maintain our fourth technological variable, 
measuring the presence or absence of storage, separately as we hope to offer some evidence that 
this variable is an important determinant of hierarchy independent of the behavior of the other 
measures of technology. 
Table 3 breaks down each technological measure, the aggregate measure of technology, the 
scale variable measuring the importance of storage, population density, and whether or not police 
are present in the society by the degree of hierarchy. The results suggest that all of these things 
increase more or less together.   
But what roles do technology, population density, and storage play in the emergence of 
hierarchy? It seems reasonable to posit that hierarchy, population density, and technology are all 
jointly determined. As we shall argue in the theoretical section of the paper, the adoption of 
hierarchy has consequences for the types of technology that may be used and the population 
density that may be sustained by a given society. Thus, a more rigorous theoretical analysis must 
rely on some sort of instrumentation strategy. Along these lines, consider once again Map 1, where 
societies that are ‘hierarchical’ according to our dichotomous variable are marked with squares or 
rectangles, while non-hierarchical societies are marked with circles. It is fairly clear from the 
geographical distribution that those societies that are hierarchical appear to be grouped closer to 
historical centers of civilization, and also appear to be centered in areas in which the environment 
might be considered richer.  
                                                                                                                                                                
weights, suggesting that a simple sum of these variables might also function quite well as an index of technological 
specialization.  
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Measures of environmental quality like those described in Table 1 should have little direct 
impact on the emergence and development of hierarchy. Environmental factors should work 
through other variables by allowing higher population density, which in turn impacts the adoption 
and creation of more sophisticated technologies. Thus, it seems reasonable to use as instruments 
for population density and technology underlying environmental characteristics. These 
environmental variables are described on table 1. One cannot be sure, however, from Map 1 that 
the clustering of hierarchical societies is due solely to similar population density and environment. 
To further control for this closeness and to allow for the possibility that hierarchical forms of 
government are learned and adopted from neighbors, we include the distance measures described 
in table 1 as further exogenous variables in regressions.11    
Table 4 presents a series of regressions in which hierarchy is the dependent variable, and 
various measures of population density and technological sophistication are used as independent 
variables. Since technology and population density may be endogenous, and because the analysis 
may suffer from omitted variables and measurement error, we report both OLS results and IV 
results, including probit specifications in which the dependent variable is absence or presence of 
hierarchy. The first two columns on table 4 are the results of OLS estimation. The second column 
reports OLS results when the three separate technology measures are replaced by the first principal 
component of the three. Not surprisingly, the results are similar and suggest that population 
density, technology, and hierarchy are significantly positively related. The third column of table 4 
presents instrumental variables results where we include distance controls in the main regression 
and use environmental characteristics as instruments. Hausman endogeneity tests for the IV 
regression reveal that one may reject the Null that population density, technology, and storage are 
                                                 
11 To be completely clear, we shall use environmental variables as instruments, while we shall use distance measures 
as additional controls in the regressions. The argument is that hierarchical behavior may be learned or may spill over 
from neighboring societies, while environmental characteristics do not determine the degree of hierarchy directly, but 
only through their impact on technological sophisticaton and population density.  
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jointly exogenous. Column 3 also includes partial F-statistics for the first-stage regressions, and 
these suggest that our instruments perform reasonably well. Moreover, the J-statistic for the 
regression suggests that the instruments are orthogonal to the model error term.  
Since our dependent variable is close to being dichotomous, we also include some probit 
model estimates on table 4, columns 4 and 5.  Column 4 presents a probit model mirroring the 
OLS specification in column 1; the results are similar to previous results. Column 5 estimates the 
probit model, including the distance controls and treating the technology and population density 
variables as endogenous. The results are again similar to the IV estimation in column 3.   
This evidence is merely meant to be suggestive of a few fundamental features of some of 
the root determinants of the degree of hierarchy in a society, and is not intended to be a rigorous 
test. Nevertheless, it is worth summarizing what we consider to be the crucial points that one may 
take from this data. First, there appears to be a relationship between the presence of hierarchy and 
policing. Second, hierarchy appears in part to be caused by greater degrees of technological 
sophistication and the presence of storage surpluses. Third, when addressing the endogeneity 
through instrumentation, it does not appear that population density is a crucial factor in driving the 
evolution of hirerachies.  In the subsequent sections, we lay out a model that describes how this 
process might work, and that is consistent with these ‘stylized facts’.   
 
3. The Static Model  
3.1 The case of anarchy 
Consider a society or group of n members, some of which earn a living as a producer (or early 
farmer) and others are supporting themselves by raiding producers, taking part of their output.  
People are risk neutral and amoral, preferring to become thieves whenever that profession is more 
profitable than producing.  The total population is described as follows: 
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(1) n = nf + nr, 
where nf denotes the number of producers, and nr denotes the number of raiders in society.  Each 
raider devotes his entire endowment of time (one unit) to raiding.  In contrast, producers split their 
time between production and defense effort to protect their output from raiders.  The time 
constraint for producers is given by 1=+ dl  where l  is labor devoted to production and d is 
defense effort by the producer.   
There are two inputs in production, land and labor. The production function is given 
by μβ lAqlqf =),( , where β, μ ≤ 1.  Land is available in fixed supply, and we normalize the total 
land base to unity.  After career choices, each producer is allotted an equal share of available land 
upon which to produce, so each producer receives (1/nf) units of land.  To simplify the analysis and 
exposition, and without affecting the qualitative results, we set μ=1 in what follows so that the 
production function for any producer, net of any theft of output, is given by:  
(2) lsAn ff
β−=π , 
In equation (2), A  is a parameter measuring the state of technology (which will be made 
endogenous below) and s  is the share of output retained by the producer.    We specify the contest 
or share function as follows:12  
(3) 
f
r
n
nd
ds
θ+
= , 
where the parameter θ  is a proxy for (lack of) security and measures the ease with which output 
can be stolen.  This parameter must take on values less than one-half, as will become evident 
below.  This share function is consistent with the idea that all raiders devote all of their efforts to 
                                                 
12 Note there is a subtle difference in Grossman’s method and the one used here. Grossman assumes the share of 
resources retained depends upon the fraction of effort devoted to defense, so s = 1 when d = 1, regardless of the 
proportion of raiders to defenders. Our specification is arguably more natural, and is certainly more commonly used in 
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theft, and each farmer bears an equal fraction of total raiding effort.  Using the time constraint and 
the share function, producers’ payoffs are defined as: 
(4) θψ+
−=π β d
d
n
dA
f
f
)1( , 
where Ψ = nr/nf, or the ratio of raiders to producers in the economy.  Under autarky, each producer 
chooses defense efforts to maximize (4) while taking the number of raiders in the population as 
given.  The optimal choice of defense is simply:  
(5) ( ) θψ−θψ+θψ= 2Ad . 
Plugging (5) into (4) gives the following expression for the optimal return to producing and 
defending for any combination of raiding and producing, nr and nf, in the economy:  
(6) 
( ) ( )
( ) θψθψ
θψθψθψθψθψθψ
π
+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−+
=
2
221
Af . 
Next, consider the payoffs for raiders.  Assuming each raider gets an equal share of the total ’take’, 
these payoffs consist of the total resources stolen from producers divided by the number of raiders:  
(7) ψ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
θψ+−
−=π β
11)1(
d
d
n
dA
f
r .  
Using the equilibrium value of defense in (5), we have:   
(8) 
( )
( ) θψθψ
θψθψθψθπ
β +
+−+=
2
21
f
r
n
A .  
In equilibrium, people are indifferent between producing and raiding so that the returns from each 
career choice should be the same.  Equating (6) and (8) results in the following expression for the 
ratio of raiders to producers in the economy (or the raid ratio): 
                                                                                                                                                                
the literature. A more general specification would raise contest effort of raiders and farmers to a certain power R.  
Baye et al. (1994) demonstrate that a symmetric Nash equilibrium then exists, even for R>2. 
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(9) θ−
θ=ψ≡
21f
r
n
n .  
Hence, the fraction of raiders in the population only depends on security parameter θ .  Amorphy, 
as defined by Hirschleifer, thus occurs in the special case where θ =0.  As θ  increases, so does the 
relative number of raiders.  When θ =½, all agents prefer to be raiders and per capita income in the 
economy has completely evaporated.  In equilibrium, we have the following number of producers:  
(10) θ
θ
−
−=
1
)21(nn f . 
The returns to productive labor are given by: 
(11) )21( θππ β −== −frf An .     
Upon substituting (10) in (11) we get an expression for equilibrium income of raiders and farmers: 
(12) ββ−β−
β−β− θ−θ−=θ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
θ−
θ−=π=π )1()21()21(
1
21 1AnAnAr
A
f .  
Note that the returns in (12) depend upon the degree of security present in society, and in particular 
go to zero as θ goes to ½. We now investigate how these outcomes are affected when a potential 
king enters the scene. 
3.2. The case of hierarchy 
Following Grossman (2002), under hierarchy, the ruler organizes defense on behalf of everybody 
in society.  While individual people still use their own effort to protect their output, the ruler 
decides on the allocation of time between production and defense.13  The key difference with 
anarchy is that the king takes into account that the number of raiders is endogenous with respect to 
the level of defense.  In other words, the ruler internalizes the external effect that raising defense 
induces some raiders to become producers instead, as opposed to the decision of individual agents 
                                                 
13 In what follows we ignore problems of free riding and cheating, and simply assume that the ruler is able to force 
”his people” to the optimal allocation of time.  For an early discussion of this simplification, refer to Williamson 
(1973). 
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that just balances foregone production versus the share of output that can be retained.  However, 
the king also reserves the right to collect taxes, and the cost of hierarchy is that the hierarch is 
concerned about his own welfare when setting taxes.  The payoffs to being a producer are now 
defined as:  
(13) θψ+
−τ−=π β
H
H
f
H
f d
d
n
dA )1()1( , 
where Hd  denotes the centralized level of defense and τ is the tax rate chosen by the hierarch.  
Assuming only legitimate activities are subject to taxation, the returns to being a raider are now 
given by:  
(14) 11)1( −β ψ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
θψ+−
−=π
H
H
f
H
r d
d
n
dA . 
The hierarch must set the level of defense and tax rate so that the following condition is satisfied: 
(15) 11)1()1()1( −ββ ψ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
θψ+−
−≥θψ+
−τ−
H
H
f
H
H
H
f
H
d
d
n
dA
d
d
n
dA ,  
otherwise, he collects no tax revenues.  Equation (15) reduces to the following condition:  
(16) θτ ≥− Hd)1( . 
The total tax revenues collected by the hierarch are then defined by βτ−= fHH nAdny /)1( . The 
hierarch chooses defense to maximize tax revenues subject to a “participation constraint” (16), or 
the condition that people prefer to produce rather than to raid.  Note this choice involves an 
elementary tradeoff.  While the government wishes to raise the tax rate, he is restricted in his 
ability to do so by the fact that raising taxes implies he should simultaneously mandate higher 
levels of defense (which comes at the expense of foregone production).  The reason is that raising 
the tax rate makes a ”switch” to raiding more attractive, ceteris paribus, which must be offset by 
an increase in defenses.  The solution to the hierarch’s problem is:  
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(17) θ=Hd .  
Not surprisingly, centralized defense levels are higher than the anarchic level of defenses, 
reflecting that the king considers the impact of defense decisions on career choice while individual 
producers do not.14  Plugging in the optimal value of τ  and Hd  into (11) gives the following 
expression for producers’ income under a ruler:  
(18)  βθθπ −−= AnHf )1( .      
We can now solve for the critical security level where people are indifferent between being raided 
and taxed by equating (12) and (18).  The critical parameter is defined by the following condition:  
(19) ββ θθθθ )1()21()1( 1 −−>− − .     
Since the right-hand-side, RHS, of (21) monotonically decreases in the magnitude of θ  for any 
value less than ½ and the left-hand-side increases and then decreases, there exists a unique 
intersection point.  Denote this threshold value as θ*.  For sufficiently large values of θ  we find 
that Af
H
f ππ > .   
While this model is suited for discussing the tradeoff between autarky and an appropriative 
government, it says nothing about how the degree of government is influenced by population and 
technological progress, or about the different possible phases in the development process of 
societies over time.  A dynamic model is necessary to consider these issues. 
 
4. A Dynamic Model 
We now introduce equations of motion to capture the intertemporal development of population 
size and the state of technology.  Following Galor (2005) and others, we assume that technical 
                                                 
14 Note that (15) defines a new constraint on parameter θ: since the time constraint implies d ≤ 1, interior solutions can 
only occur for θ < 1 as well.  Since this “hierarchy constraint” is less stringent than the anarchy constraint, θ < ½, it 
will be satisfied automatically. 
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progress is one of the main drivers of the model, and aim to capture the process of innovation and 
depreciation (erosion) of the state of technology as follows:  
(20) AAnA f δ−υ= γα? , 
where dtdAA /=? .  The first term on the RHS captures innovations and the second term captures 
erosion of technology (δ denotes a depreciation parameter).  The specification in (20) assumes the 
state of technology is increasing in the current state of technology, A, and in the population of 
producers which may be due to some ’innovation by doing’ argument, or because higher 
population density allows for a faster exchange of ideas, etc. (e.g. Shekhar et al., 2006).  Although 
this is not important for the model that follows, we envisage the gradual increase in A over time as 
the gradual transition from foraging to early farming.   
One implication of 0>A?  is that output becomes easier to steal – increases in output 
(surpluses) not only imply that guarding output becomes harder, theft may also be facilitated due 
to changes in the nature of production.  For example, if producers rely more on harvesting produce 
that they have planted or sown themselves, then raiders may have relatively easy access to the 
stock when it is on the field.  This means it is realistic to assume that the security parameter θ is 
not invariant with respect to technology levels.  We capture this idea by assuming a linear relation 
between the state of technology and the ease with which output can be stolen (the results are robust 
with respect to alternative monotonic relationships):  
(21) θ ≡ zA,  
where z is just a scaling parameter.  In line with the earlier discussions on threshold values for the 
security parameter θ , specification (21) defines an upper limit on productivity for the anarchy and 
hierarchy models to be sensible – respectively zAA 2/1=<  and zAA /1~ =< .  Failing to satisfy 
these conditions implies all become raiders (for the anarchy model) or producers allocate all their 
time to defenses and there is no production (for the hierarchy model).  
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Recall people are indifferent between anarchy and hierarchy when θ = θ* (or A = A*).  For 
θ > θ* (or A > A*) the dynamics of the state of technology are determined in the context of a 
society governed by a ruler.  Instead, for θ < θ* (or A < A*), anarchy prevails and some people 
prefer to raid rather than produce.  This means we must derive two different segments of the 0=A?  
isocline associated with (20), or two distinct segments where technology is constant.  One segment 
is relevant for the anarchy context (where some people are raiding, Ψ>0, and not contributing to 
the accumulation of knowledge) and another one is relevant for the hierarchy context (Ψ=0).  
Solving for 0=A?  under anarchy and hierarchy results in, respectively:   
(22a) 
αγ− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
υ
δ
−
−=
/1
1
21
1 A
zA
zAn , and   
 (22b) 
αγ− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
υ
δ=
/1
1An . 
Equations (22a) and (22b) imply that, at A=A*, there is a discontinuity in the 0=A?  isocline, 
which jumps downwards then (note 0 < (1-zA)/(1-2zA) < 1). 
Specification of a population growth process completes the system’s dynamics.  Following 
a large literature on early economic civilizations (e.g. Brander and Taylor 1998, Horan et al. 2005) 
we describe population dynamics by a simple Malthusian process: 
(23) ,1 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ π+−ϕ=
S
n
dt
dn i  
where ϕ is a population growth parameter, i denotes anarchy or hierarchy, and S is a food intake 
threshold (minimum caloric intake for self-maintenance).  For π < S, the population shrinks and for 
π > S  it grows.  We ignore the king’s income as his fertility decisions are relatively unimportant 
relative to those of the population at large, and use the people’s income as provided in (12) and 
(18) (but qualitatively similar outcomes obtain if we would base the analysis on total income in the 
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economy). Condition (23) is readily solved for the 0=n?  isocline by setting π = S and, again, there 
are 2 distinct isocline segments depending on whether A is greater or smaller than A*.  The isocline 
segments for anarchy and hierarchy, respectively, are given by: 
(24a) 
βββ−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=
/11 )1()21(
S
zAzAAn , and  
(24b) 
β
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
/1
)1(
S
zAzAAn .   
With these building blocks in place, we can now turn to an analysis of the dynamics of population 
growth and technical change, and the consequences for institutional change.  
 
5. Model results 
Before we analyze the dynamics and steady states in some detail, it is instructive to consider the 
impact of technical change on some of the model’s key variables in equilibrium.  In Figure 1 we 
demonstrate that the anarchic raid ratio (ψ), or the number of raiders divided by their victims, 
increases as the state of technology increases.  While an increase in productivity increases the 
returns to both producing and raiding (so that the net effect is neutral)15, there is an additional 
effect due to the assumption that the production and storage of surpluses enhances the ease with 
which output can be stolen – tipping the balance in favor of becoming a raider.  The net effect of 
technical change on income of producers and raiders is ambiguous, depending on the level of 
technical change (see Figure 3 below).  Technical change raises the value marginal product of 
labor allocated to production, but since fewer people actually produce the net effect on income is 
unclear.  Specifically, if we consider the case where society is in anarchy before and after the 
                                                 
15 Note that the argument A does not appear in (9) – the raid ratio is only a function of security parameter θ. 
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increase in A (so that equation (12) describes income throughout), we can use (21) to show that 
technical change is detrimental for income if: 
(25)    041 <−=π zA
dA
d , 
which is the case whenever A > 1/4z, or when the raid ratio curve is sufficiently steep (see Figures 
1 and 3). 
   < Figure 1 about here > 
Next, consider the case of hierarchy.  In Figure 2 we show that an increase in the state of 
technology lowers the equilibrium tax rate.  Since technical progress makes raiding more 
attractive, the ruler aims to neutralize the incentive to switch from producing to raiding, and 
lowering the tax rate so that producers can retain a larger share of their output is one approach to 
doing this.  An alternative approach to restoring the balance between producing and raiding would 
be to raise the levels of defense, but this comes at the cost of foregone production.  To find the 
optimal tax rate, the ruler balances the foregone profit share from low taxes versus the foregone 
output from raising defense levels.  Hence, while technical advances ambiguously impact on 
producers’ income under conditions of anarchy, when ruled by a king it makes producers 
unambiguously better off – it allows them to retain a greater share of a larger pie.  One may use 
(18) to verify that 0/ >π dAd H .     
< Figure 2 about here > 
In Figure 3 we provide equilibrium income for anarchic and hierarchical societies.  As 
explained above, the relation between the state of technology and income under anarchy is non-
monotonous.  The critical level of technology A*, and the associated critical security parameter θ*, 
is defined by the unique interior intersection of the two income curves. 
< Figure 3 about here > 
5.1 Analysis of the dynamic system 
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The analysis until now implies that simple models with exogenous technical change (i.e., 
teAA σ= 0?  where σ is a parameter) will necessarily undergo the transition from anarchy to 
hierarchy: eventually the level of technology will be sufficiently high to elect a king in power.  Is 
this also true for our dynamic model with endogenous technical change?  The answer is no.  For 
different parameter combinations we obtain qualitatively different results.  In what follows we 
illustrate this important point by presenting two interesting cases.   
In Figure 4 we provide the phase plane for one possible configuration of parameters, 
providing the isoclines as derived in (22) and (24).16  On the horizontal axis the state of technology 
is depicted, and the vertical axis provides population numbers (or density).  As before, A* denotes 
the critical technology level, so that for A < A* the anarchy segments (22a, 24a) are relevant, and 
for A > A* the hierarchy segments (22b, 24b).  The present configuration has two potentially stable 
interior steady states: in both the anarchy and hierarchy sectors of the phase plane the 
0=A? isocline cuts the 0=n? isocline from below, which implies that each steady state is a 
focus or node.  The stability of the steady states depends on the relative slopes of the isoclines, and 
may be analyzed further by examining the eigenvalues of the linearized system in equilibrium.   
< Figure 4 about here > 
The existence of a potentially stable steady state in the anarchy sector implies that societies 
may “get stuck” to the left of A* and never elect a king.  These low-tech societies prefer to go 
untaxed and provide defense on a decentralized basis.  We interpret these societies with low 
productivity levels and little or no storage of commodities as stable foragers’ societies.  Other 
societies, however, will cross the security (or productivity) threshold – possibly because the 
trajectories cycle outward.  Depending on the trajectory, such societies will eventually support a 
king providing efficient levels of security, or cycle back towards the anarchic segment.  Indeed, as 
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in Usher (1989) it may be feasible to have ‘dynastic cycles’ where societies grow and collapse and 
undergo periodic phases of anarchy.17  The model predicts farmers’ societies where storable and 
‘lootable’ surpluses are produced will settle down in the hierarchic steady state.  This is a 
prediction that is amenable to empirical testing in section 5.18 
The phase plane suggests that societies are more likely to become hierarchical if the initial 
level of technology is ‘high’ (i.e. close to the threshold) or if the population is ‘large.’19  In 
contrast, societies with few people are likely to evolve towards anarchy, even if their initial level 
of technology places them to the right of the threshold.  The reason is that such societies will 
gradually lose their level of technical sophistication as new innovations fail to keep pace with the 
erosion of knowledge (similar to the findings in Shekhar et al., 2006).  As an interesting aside, 
while population size is important during the transition phase, the model predicts that equilibrium 
population size of the anarchy and hierarchy steady state cannot be unambiguously ranked.  
Indeed, for the combination of parameters underlying Figure 4 we find that the hierarchical society 
is smaller than the anarchic one.  Again, this is a model implication that may be amenable to 
empirical testing. 
In Figure 5 we present an alternative phase plane based on a different set of parameters.20  
This is the case where the 0=A? isocline cuts the 0=n? isocline from below in the anarchy 
sector (as before), and from above in the hierarchy sector of the phase plane.  The anarchy steady 
state is again a focus or node, but the hierarchic steady state is now a saddle point.  The separatrix 
                                                                                                                                                                
16 To be precise, Figure 4 is based on z=1, α=0.3, β=0.3, δ=0.9, γ=0.2, ν=1.0 and S=0.205. 
17 But unlike the model of Usher, the dynamics are not governed by diminishing returns in production and a king that 
voluntarily steps down – it is driven by cycles of population abundance that affect productivity levels and the ease with 
which output can be stolen (affecting the incentives of the people to support a king, or not). 
18 An additional effect, not captured by the model, is that agriculture and storage facilitate financing a hierarch as it 
makes it much easier to collect taxes: agricultural output is readily observable, and storage enables accumulatation of 
resources to pay for taxes. 
19 The intuition for the latter is evident: if societies start sufficiently ”high” in the phase plane, they will necessarily 
cross the A = A* threshold.  The reason is that technical change occurs at a rapid rate in societies with many people.  
Even if the population ”shrinks”, the level is high enough to induce a transition from foraging to early agriculture.  
20 Figure 5 is based on z=1, α=0.135, β=0.3, δ=0.9, γ=0.9, ν=1.0 and S=0.15. 
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associated with the saddle point divides the hierarchy sector in two parts – below the separatrix the 
system is pushed (back) towards anarchy, above if the system is pushed on a path of sustained 
growth where population increases and technical mutually increase each other.  In other words, an 
anarchic society that faces a sufficiently large (temporary) productivity shock – say, a climatic 
shock or significant technical innovation (possibly through technology import) – will face a 
fundamentally different future.  This will happen if due to the shock the system “jumps” above the 
separatrix.  Not only will it elect a king in power, it will also experience sustained growth where 
population growth spurs technical change, and where the income increase following technical 
change permits Malthusian style population growth.  
< Figure 5 about here >   
This is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of all potential dynamic outcomes.  For 
example, some parameter values imply the anarchic steady state disappears (i.e., the isoclines do 
not intersect for values of A below A*) and others imply it changes into a saddle point.  The latter 
possibility suggests that for some initial conditions (specifically: for starting points below the 
anarchy separatrix) society will become trapped in a vicious circle of population decline and 
technical regression, and eventually go extinct.  For other initial conditions, of course, the 
transition to hierarchy is inevitable.  Detailed knowledge about underlying parameters of societies 
is necessary to predict the qualitative nature of its long-term fate. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Why do some societies evolve from anarchy to hierarchy, and why do other societies fail to make 
that transition?  We propose a novel explanation by focusing on internal conflict (raiding) and the 
tradeoffs between decentralized and centralized levels of defense.  While centralized levels of 
defense are efficient – taking external effects into account – and increase total output relative to 
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anarchic equilibrium levels, there is an associated cost for producers as the ruling elite is capable to 
tax away part of the surplus for its own consumption.  The main result of the paper is that 
producers prefer to be taxed, rather than be raided, if production technology is sufficiently 
advanced.  Using a dynamic model with endogenous population and technology we demonstrate 
that the evolution from anarchy to hierarchy is possible, but not inevitable – some (foraging) 
societies will prefer to stay egalitarian and anarchic.   
Our empirical analysis, based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample, supports the model’s 
main predictions.  Using OLS and IV estimation techniques we find that technology levels are an 
important driver of the degree of hierarchy in indigenous cultures, and that ‘storage’ plays a 
particularly important role in this respect.  The latter result makes perfect sense in the context of 
our model because, in line with several anthropologists, we argue that the ability to store output is 
one of the main determinants of raiding and conflict (enhancing the appeal of efficient levels of 
defense).  Consistent with the theory model, our empirical work also downplays the role of 
population size as a determining factor in the emergence of hierarchic structures.  The potential 
efficiency gains from centralized public good provision are therefore not necessarily an overriding 
concern for community members when deciding about whether to elect a king, or not. 
The theoretical model is very stylized and ignores many salient features of reality.  For 
example, we don’t consider that some communities may be able to coordinate on optimal levels of 
defenses in the absence of a ruler, or that security parameter θ may be subject to technical change 
(related to technical advances in production, or otherwise).  We also ignore the issue of external 
conflict – including fights over territories of different communities – which may clearly provide an 
important impetus for centralized organization of defense (see Baker 2003).  Finally, by assuming 
all community members have identical skills we assume away that there may be internal conflict 
over whether to switch from anarchy to hierarchy, or not.  Members that are more productive than 
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others, or have access to more productive land, will prefer to make the transition at some lower 
critical value of technology.  This could result in societies “breaking up” or in some faction 
imposing its will on another.  Analyzing these issues, and others, is left for future work. 
 27
Literature cited 
Alchian, A.E. and H. Demsetz, (1972), “Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization,” American Economic Review 62, pp. 777-795. 
Alesina, A. and E. Spolaore, (1997). “On the Number and Size of Nations,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112, pp. 1027-1056 
Alesina, A. and E. Spolaore, (2005). “War, Peace, and the Size of Nations,” Journal of Public 
Economics 89, pp. 1333-1354. 
Alesina, A. and E. Spolaore, (2006). “Conflict, Defense Spending and the Number of Nations,” 
European Economic Review, In Press. 
Baker, M. J., (2003), “An equilibrium model of land tenure in hunter-gatherer societies,” Journal 
of Political Economy 111, pp 124-173. 
Baker, M. J., and Thomas Miceli (2005), “Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural 
Analysis,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 56(1): pp. 77-102. 
Baker, M. J., (2005), “A Structural Model of the Neolithic Revolution,” United States Naval 
Academy Department of Economics Working Paper 2005-9.  
Baye, M.R., D. Kovenock and C.G. de Vries, (1994), “The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking 
Game when R > 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates,” Public Choice 
81, pp. 363-380. 
Bell, B. (1971), “The Dark Ages in Ancient History,” American Journal of Archaeology 75(1): pp. 
1-26. 
Bolton, P. and G. Roland, (1997). “The Break-up of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, pp. 1057-1090. 
Bolton, P., G. Roland and E. Spolaore (1996), “Economic Theories of the Breakup and Integration 
of Nations,” European Economic Review 40, pp. 697-706. 
 28
Brander, A. and M. Taylor (1998), “The Simple Economics of Easter Island: A Ricardo-Malthus  
Model of Renewable Resource Use,” American Economic Review 88, pp.  119-38. 
Cashdan, Elizabeth (2001), “Ethnic Diversity and Its Environmental Determinants: Effects of 
Climate, Pathogens, and Habitat Diversity,” American Anthropologist 103: pp. 968-991. 
Diamond, J. (1997), Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies,  
New York: WW Norton. 
Fernandez-Armesto, F. (2000), Civilizations, London: Macmillan. 
Galor O. (2005), “From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory,” Handbook of Economic 
Growth, 2005, 171-293. 
Gray, J. Patrick, ed. (2006), World Cultures: Journal of Comparative and Cross Cultural 
Research.  Journal Jamaica, NY: Social Sciences Department, York College – City 
University of New York. 
Grossman, H.I. (2002), ”’Make us a king’: anarchy, predation, and the state,” European Journal of 
Political Economics 18, pp. 31-46. 
Grossman, H.I. and S.J. Noh (1994), “Proprietary public finance and economic welfare,” Journal 
of Public Economics 53, pp. 187-204.  
Hirschleifer, J., (1995), “Anarchy and its breakdown,” Journal of Political Economy 103, pp. 26-
52 
Horan, R.D, E.H. Bulte and J.F. Shogren (2005), “How trade saved humanity from biological 
exclusion : an economic theory of Neanderthal extinction,” Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 59, pp. 297-323 
Murdock, George P., and Caterina Provost (1973), ”Measurement of Cultural Complexity,”   
            Ethnology 12: pp. 379-392. 
Murdock, George P., and Douglas White (1969), ”The Standard Cross-Cultural Sample,” 
 29
 Ethnology 8: pp. 329-369. 
Price, T.D. (1995), ”Social Inequality at the Origins of Agriculture,” in G.M. Feinman and T.D. 
Price (eds) Foundations of Social Inequality, London: Plenum Press, pp. 129–151. 
Frederic L. Pryor, 1986. The Adoption of Agriculture: Some Theoretical and Empirical Evidence.  
            American Anthropologist 88:pp. 894-897.  
Shekhar A, C.-J. Dalgaard and O. Moav (2006), “Technological Progress and Regress in  
Pre-industrial Times,” CEPR Discussion Paper No 5454 
Usher, D., (1987), “Theft as a paradigm for departures from efficiency,” Oxford Economic Papers 
39, pp. 235-252 
Usher, D., (1989), “The dynastic cycle and the stationary state,” American Economic Review 79, 
pp. 1031-1044 
Weisdorf, J.L. (2005), “From Foraging to Farming: Explaining the Neolithic Revolution,” Journal 
of Economic Surveys 19, pp. 561-586 
Williamson, O.E. (1973), “Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations,” American 
Economic Review 63, pp. 316-325 
 30
  
FIGURE 1 
RAID RATIO AND TECHNOLOGY  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
OPTIMAL TAX RATE AND TECHNOLOGY  
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FIGURE 3 
PAY-OFFS AND TECHNOLOGY  
 
Pay-off: π 
Technology: A A* 
Anarchy Hierarchy 
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FIGURE 4 
POPULATION AND TECHNOLOGY DYNAMICS  
(TWO POTENTIALLY STABLE STEADY STATES) 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
POPULATION AND TECHNOLOGY DYNAMICS  
(ONE POTENTIALLY STABLE STEADY STATE, ONE SADDLE-PATH STABLE) 
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MAP 1: THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND HIERARCHY IN THE SCCS
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 TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 Description Source 
Technology and 
population  
  
Jurisdictional 
Hierarchy 
=1 if none, =2 if petty chiefdoms, =3 if larger chiefdoms, =4 if 
states, =5 if there are multi-layered states 
SCCS 
Policing present =1 if police are present in the society, =0 otherwise SCCS 
 
Agriculture Scale - 
Importance of 
Agriculture and its 
Nature 
=1 if none, =2 if <10% of food supply, =3 if >10% and of 
secondary importance in food supply, =4 if primary but not 
intensive, =5 if primary and intensive 
SCCS 
Storage Surplus =1 none or barely adequate, =2 simple storage or adequate, =3 
if complex and more than adequate 
SCCS 
Technological 
specialization 
=0 if no specialization present, =1 if pottery only,  
=2 if loom weaving only, =3 if metalwork only,  
=4 if smiths, weavers, and potters 
SCCS 
Writing and 
Record-Keeping 
=0 none, =1 Mnemonic devices, =2 Non-written records, =3 
True writing, no records, =4 True writing, records  
SCCS 
Population Density =1 if < 1 persons per square mile, =2 1-5 persons per square 
mile, =3 if 5-25 persons per square mile, =4 if 25-100 persons 
per square mile, =5 100 persons per square mile 
SCCS 
Technology index 1st Principal component of Specialization, Writing, and 
Agricultural Contribution  
 
 
 Exogenous Variables  
Environmental 
Characteristics 
  
Mean Rainfall Mean yearly rainfall (cm) SCCS, from Cashdan (2003)
Climate suitability 
for agriculture  
Scale ranging from 0 (impossible) to 4 (very good) developed 
by Pryor using FAO/UNESCO reports 
SCCS, from Pryor (1986) 
Soil suitability for 
agriculture 
Scale ranging from 0 (impossible) to 4 (very good) developed 
by Pryor using FAO/UNESCO  
SCCS, from Pryor (1986) 
Land slope Scale ranging from 2 to 4, 2=steep, 4=relatively flat SCCS, from Pryor (1986) 
No. habitats w/in 
200 miles 
Based on counting the number of vegetation types, ocean and 
lake presence within 200 mile diameter 
SCCS, from Cashdan (2003) 
Geography/Time   
Distance from fertile 
crescent 
Calculated using society coordinates in SCCS, with the fertile 
crescent at 45E, 35N (.786, .611 in radians) 
Baker (2005) 
Closer to another 
hearth?  
=1 if closest to another original hearth of agriculture 
(Northeastern U. S., Central America, South China) 
Baker (2005) 
Distance from 
closest hearth 
Calculated using society coordinates in SCCS, with the 
Northeastern U. S., Central America, and South China as other 
hearths. 
Baker (2005) 
“Vertical” distance 
from fertile crescent 
Calculated to be miles north or south from fertile crescent.  Baker (2005) 
“Vertical” distance 
from closest hearth 
Miles north or south from nearest hearth of 
agriculture/civilization. 
Baker (2005) 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ALL VARIABLES, BY PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF HIERARCHY  
 
Variable All Societies 
N=186 
Hierarchical Societies  
N=102 
Non-Hierarchical Ssocieties 
N=82 
Policing Dummy 
 
.33 
(0.47) 
0.53*** 
(0.50) 
.10*** 
(0.30) 
Population Density Scale 2.86 
(1.56) 
3.48*** 
(1.36)
2.04*** 
(1.39) 
Technology Index – First 
Principal Component of 
Agriculture, Spec., and 
Writing Scales. 
0 
(1.41) 
0.64*** 
(1.31) 
-0.83*** 
(1.00) 
Contribution of 
Agriculture 
3.45 
(1.51) 
3.97*** 
(1.21) 
2.77*** 
(1.58) 
Technological 
Specialization 
3.09 
(1.41) 
3.65*** 
(1.32) 
2.38*** 
(1.21) 
Writing and Record 
Keeping 
2.35 
(1.47) 
2.89*** 
(1.62) 
1.65*** 
(0.85) 
Storage Surplus 1.81 
(0.72) 
1.92** 
(0.70) 
1.67** 
(0.72) 
Exogenous Variables 
 
Mean rainfall (cm/year) 140.74 
(106.00) 
136.72 
(99.88) 
147.84 
(113.92) 
Climate suitability for 
agriculture 
3.13 
(1.16) 
3.29* 
(0.92) 
2.96* 
(1.40) 
Soil suitability for 
agriculture 
2.07 
(0.77) 
2.18** 
(0.68) 
1.91** 
(0.86) 
Land slope 3.29 
(0.74) 
3.28 
(0.73) 
3.33 
(0.73) 
Number habitats w/in 
200 miles (N=172) 
3.93 
(1.35) 
3.87 
(1.32) 
3.95 
(1.36) 
Distance from Fertile 
Crescent (miles) 
4996.70 
(2456.02) 
4137.96*** 
(2495.33) 
6036.95*** 
(1961.32) 
Vertical Distance from 
Fertile Crescent (miles) 
1859.50 
(1248.37) 
1623.39*** 
(1160.26) 
2144.03*** 
(1298.53) 
Closer to another hearth? 0.66 
(0.47) 
0.5*** 
(0.50) 
0.85*** 
(0.36) 
Distance to closest 
hearth (miles) 
2395.27 
(1256.75) 
2237.04* 
(1312.33) 
2594.23* 
(1170.73) 
Vertical distance to 
closest hearth (miles) 
1647.46 
(1077.28) 
1452.05*** 
(1109.03) 
1884.60*** 
(1001.32) 
**    Difference in means significant at 5% 
*** Difference in means significant at 1% (assuming unequal variances)  
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TABLE 3: AVERAGE POPULATION DENSITY AND TECHNOLOGY BY THE DEGREE OF HIERARCHY. 
Degree of 
Hierarchy 
Obs. Population 
Density 
% Police 
Presence 
Technology variables 
  Writing 
scale 
Agriculture 
scale 
Specialization 
scale 
Storage 
scale 
Technology 
scale 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
82 
48 
23 
19 
12 
2.04 
2.94 
3.74 
3.89 
4.50
0.09 
0.27 
0.61 
0.79 
1.00 
1.65 
2.06 
2.73 
4.21 
4.41
2.77 
3.44 
4.13 
4.47 
5.00
2.37 
2.96 
3.69 
4.47 
5.00
1.67 
1.87 
1.70 
2.11 
2.25 
-0.83 
-0.17 
1.16 
1.67 
2.18
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TABLE 4: SOME EMPIRICAL MODELS OF HIERARCHY AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Degree of 
Hierarchy 
Degree of 
Hierarchy 
Degree of 
Hierarchy 
Hierarchy 
Dummy 
Hierarchy 
Dummy 
Method OLS OLS IV, GMM Probit Probit, IV 
Population Density 0.165*** 
(0.054) 
0.108** 
(0.053) 
-0.386 
(0.279) 
0.273*** 
(0.090) 
-0.402 
(0.510) 
Technology Index - 0.557*** 
(0.059) 
1.347*** 
(0.339) 
- 1.687** 
(.760) 
Agricultural scale 
variable 
 
0.043 
(0.057) 
 - 0.032 
(0.094) 
- 
 
Technological 
specialization scale 
 
0.240*** 
(0.057) 
 - 0.235** 
(0.095) 
 
Storage and Surplus 
 
0.137 
(0.090) 
0.123 
(0.093) 
.736* 
(.386) 
0.118 
(0.153) 
1.531* 
(0.917) 
Writing and Record-
Keeping 
 
0.339*** 
(0.049) 
 - 0.331*** 
(0.097) 
- 
Constant -0.314 
(0.215) 
1.563*** 
(0.214) 
1.220 
(0.807) 
-2.337*** 
(0.422) 
-2.079*** 
(2.084) 
Distance Controls? No No Yes No Yes 
R2 
  
0.560 0.522 0.533 0.286 
(pseudo) 
- 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.548 0.514 0.528 - - 
Hansen J-Statistic:  
(p-val) 
  .702 
(.704) 
  
Partial F-statistics: 
     Population Density 
     Technology Index  
     Storage and Surplus 
 
   
6.46 
5.32 
3.04 
  
Obs. 184 184 170 184 170 
Notes: * significant at 10%, **=significant at 5%, ***= significant at 1%. In the case in which an instrumental variables regression is reported, the 
instruments used are the environmental and geographical variables (described in table 1). Standard IV estimates are obtained using GMM to allow 
for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. Probit IV estimates are obtained using a two-step estimator.  
  
  
  
